CLOUD HARNESS HaaS
CloudHarness HaaS bridges self-hosted coding harnesses and elastic, multi-tenant cloud clusters. Architectural specification for executing untrusted coding agent workloads with sub-150ms cold boot target, hard block quotas, and double-entry metering.
Mutually distrustful tenants require hardware-level boundaries. CloudHarness specifies an explicit 3-tier isolation ladder to eliminate cross-tenant contamination.
Self-hosted deployment on your own Linux VPS for individual engineers and tightly-knit teams with mutual trust.
Hard hypervisor boundary provided by the cloud provider. Exactly one isolated cloud VPS provisioned per paying customer.
High-density hardware virtualization for public multi-tenant pooled clusters on bare-metal servers.
Proposed architecture: Worker nodes initiate outbound mTLS streams to the central control plane, eliminating all public inbound listening ports on execution nodes.
Tokens are structured as <id>.<secret> and verified via Argon2id with guarded database row consumption. Stdin ingestion (--token-stdin) or root-only 0600 file ingestion with descriptor-based O_NOFOLLOW checks prevents process table or bash history leaks.
If a worker node loses connection to the control plane for > 30 seconds, a local watchdog timer self-fences the node and pauses active containers. Reconnection requires monotonic lease_epoch revalidation before execution can resume.
Database-enforced invariant: Dedicated tenant workspaces are routed strictly to nodes with matching nodes.tenant_id foreign keys. General tenant workloads are rejected from dedicated hardware enclaves.
Target model: Fair, fraud-resistant pricing combining duration tracking with tool execution request volume.
Target specification: Workspaces with no incoming tool calls for 15 minutes are planned to automatically suspend, halting duration metering immediately and resuming in under 2 seconds.
Planned design: Billing events execute an atomic PostgreSQL transaction (post_journal) ensuring balanced debits and credits with sub-cent micro-USD integer scale.
Planned design: Payment webhooks (Polar.sh and Stripe) are designed to validate HMAC signatures against raw byte buffers with timestamp tolerances (<300s) and composite key deduplication.
Proposed security policy: Strict regional isolation with cryptographic erasure upon workspace termination.
Proposed policy: Worker nodes are planned to be partitioned into regional silos (e.g. EU, US). Repository clones and ephemeral snapshots never cross geographical boundaries.
Security invariant: Workspace termination wipes ephemeral AES-256 snapshot keys immediately. Unused storage blocks on thin-provisioned NVMe volumes are securely trimmed.
Incident runbook: Syscall anomalies or jailer seccomp violations trigger instant node cordoning, certificate revocation via CRL, and tamper-evident audit logging.
Under explicit security authorization, memory state is captured directly into an access-controlled, asymmetric encrypted container (AES-256-GCM + ephemeral key pair) with mandatory 30-day retention. By default, unmanaged rogue microVMs are terminated immediately with complete cryptographic key erasure and zero plaintext memory preservation (ADR 0001 Design).
Join our invite-only Dedicated Commercial Beta for engineering teams deploying high-concurrency coding agents.